# Specifying Runtime Functionality of Downloadable Components under the Sandbox Model

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#### Sorry, misNaming!

# Specifying Runtime *Environment*for Downloadable Components


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#### Outline

- Why we specify the environments?
   Confusion for using mobile code system.
- Objective of our work.
- How to specify the environments?
  - Overview of our specification.
  - Tools for our specification.
- Advantages and Disadvantages of our Spec


#### Confusion 1

• Confusion for setting the *many services* for mobile codes.




#### Confusion 2

• Confusion for *deploying codes* for mobile.



#### Confusion 3

• Confusion for *identifying current security*, Security is sensitive to the environment.



# Objective of our Work

- Decreasing above confusions of mobile code users.

  Currently, not support
  - Support for checking whether servers work adequately or not.
  - Support for checking whether
     the code deployment is suitable or not.
  - Support for identifying
     whether the security works good or not.

# Overview of our Spec.

- Specification of runtime environment
  - Spec. for code deployment.
  - Spec. for security policy for the machine, where the codes are running.
- Specification of mobile code
  - Search path for loading codes used by the code.
  - Relationship between the code and its birthplace.
  - Functionality of the code.

### Tools for our Spec.

- Z notation: state based formal notation.
  - well known.
  - simple predicate calculus and sets.
  - match for OO system.
  - formal reasoning.

# Example of our Spec.

#### Env. Spec.

```
deploy: Loc \rightarrow \mathbb{P} ByteCode
```

```
SysRes = \frac{}{res : R \rightarrow Bool; \ limit : \mathbb{P}R; \ here : Loc}
limit \subseteq dom \ res
\forall \ x : limit \bullet (x, false) \in res
here \in dom \ deploy
```

#### Comp. Spec.

```
birth : Loc; byte : ByteCode
lslctr : seq Loc
birth \in ran \ lslctr
birth \in dom \ deploy
```

For more detail, in proceedings.

# Example of Formal Reasoning

• This schema also tells `Cracking is established even if the security manager is set'

```
SetLimit \ \S \ (SetLoader \land \Xi SysRes \ \S \ Crack \ \S \ Func \land \Xi Class \land \Xi SysRes) \setminus Class \ | \ pas! \in l? \land sl? = \langle here, there \rangle
```

• The above becomes consistent under the deployment:

```
deploy = \{(here, \{byte, \cdots\}), (there, \{byte, \cdots\}) \cdots \}.
```

# Advantages of our Spec.

- Reasoning whether your intended security and application functionalities are preserved or not.
- Traceability for security and functionality change.

# Disadvantages of our Spec.

- Hard to read, formal notation.
- Breaking the modularity of spec; environments and codes.



• We should explore the **parameterization** for the properties of **environment among the component** spec.